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Every case of humanitarian intervention gives rise to mixed feelings
of hope and despair. Hope comes from the involvement of the interna-
tional community, and despair comes from the fact that the state system
is still too weak to meet its basic responsibility, namely, the protection
of human dignity. Influenced by these mixed feelings, the present article
attempts a new look at the concept of humanitarian intervention. In Part
I, it examines the concept of humanitarian intervention. Part II analyzes
the principal aspects of humanitarian intervention: the reasons for the
intervention, the character of the target state, and the status of the inter-
venor. In Part III, the article examines the major issues involved in these
interventions, particularly their objectives, validity, nature, and priority.
This exercise exposes some striking inadequacies in the existing law
relating to humanitarian intervention. An understanding and appreciation
of these inadequacies would help in the evolution of a new international
humanitarian order, the salient features of which are discussed in Part
IV of the article.
t This is a revised version of the First Mohammad Azhar Nomani Memorial Lecture
delivered by the author on July 30, 1994 under the auspices of the Indian Institute of Public
Administration, Regional Branch, Jammu, India.
* Provost, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
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I. THE CONCEPT
Humanitarian intervention is a fragile alliance of two different con-
cepts: human rights and intervention. The concept of human rights is
highly respectable, whereas the concept of intervention is highly prob-
lematic. The law applicable to humanitarian intervention has not only
inherited the ambiguities present in both of these concepts, but has also
generated ambiguities of its own through century-old, haphazard, and
controversial practices of states and non-state entities.
The basis for a humanitarian intervention lies in the absence of a
minimum moral order in the whole or a part of a state, which is incon-
sistent with fundamental humanitarian norms and unacceptable to other
states or non-state entities. Such a state of affairs may provoke external
forces to determine that the continuing existence of such a situation
deprives the people of the target state of their legitimate rights and
freedoms and also shocks the conscience of the international community.
Prompted by such a determination, external forces may have to make a
choice between the status quo and an attempt to correct the situation.
They may decide to intervene in the target state if the expected utility of
the corrective action is greater than permitting the status quo to contin-
ue. To ensure the legitimacy of such corrective action, they may rely
either on traditional practices or on contemporary norms of legitimiza-
tion such as a prior authorization by a regional or international intergov-
ernmental organization. The decision to take action, as well as the
choice of means, depends on the expected utility of corrective action.
From this perspective, humanitarian intervention is an extraordinary
exercise by external forces (another state, group of states, international
organization, or a combination thereof) in the internal affairs of a target
state in order to impose certain humanitarian values and practices on the
latter. The following section examines the principal aspects of humani-
tarian intervention.
II. PRINCIPAL ASPECTS
There are three principal aspects to every humanitarian intervention:
the reasons for intervention, the character of target state, and the legal
and moral status of the intervenor.
A. Reasons for Intervention
Traditionally, powerful states resorted to humanitarian intervention,
individually or collectively, to protect or rescue their nationals abroad.
[Vol. 16:883
Humanitarian Intervention Revisited
This first generation of humanitarian intervention originated at a time
when the use of force in international relations was not prohibited, and
it continues even in the contemporary world where the prohibition of the
use of force has become a peremptory norm of international law. The
landing of British troops in China in 1927 for the protection of British
subjects; the action by the United Kingdom in landing forces in Egypt
in 1956; the intervention by the United States in Lebanon in 1958 and
in the Dominican Republic in 1965; Belgium's action in the Congo in
1960; the Israeli rescue operation at Entebbe airport in 1976; and the
joint Belgian, French, and U.S. intervention in the Shaba province of
Zaire in 1978 are important examples of this category of intervention.
With the passage of time, the scope of humanitarian intervention has
expanded to include actions to protect nationals of third states and even
nationals of the target state, especially its minority groups. This expan-
sion occurred primarily in the form of treaties for the protection of
minorities during the League of Nations era. The establishment of the
United Nations brought about a major change in the perception of
humanitarian intervention. On the one hand, the U.N. Charter prohibited
the use of force; on the other, it imposed an obligation on every state to
protect human rights. As a result, the Charter firmly established state
responsibility with respect to human rights and also curtailed the free-
dom of others to intervene in the internal affairs of a state, lest it lead to
the use of force against the territorial integrity, political independence,
or sovereignty of the state. The champions of humanitarian intervention
extended the ambit of state responsibility and sought to restrict the
prohibition on intervention in some circumstances. They continued to
rely on the "inherent right" to protect or rescue nationals (both natural
and juridical). In addition, they claimed joint responsibility (in fact, a
right) to oversee respect for human rights all over the globe. Their
position found support in jurisprudence that elevated human rights
obligations to the status of erga omnes obligations (6 la the Barcelona
Traction Co. case).' On the basis of an argued locus standi with respect
to all human rights matters, some states have exercised the "right" of
intervention in the internal affairs of states whenever they felt it neces-
sary and convenient to do so. Thus, claims to the protection of minori-
ties, in particular, and the enforcement of human rights in general gave
rise to the second generation of humanitarian intervention. The interven-
tion by Great Britain, France, and Russia in 1827 in the Greece-Turkey
struggle; India's intervention in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971;
1. Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 5), at paras. 33-34.
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Tanzania's intervention in Uganda in 1978-79; the U.S. actions in
Grenada in 1983, in Nicaragua in the mid-1980s, in Panama in 1989,
and in Iraq in 1991; and the joint U.S.-Italian "Operation United Shield"
in Somalia in 1995 are leading examples of this kind of intervention.
The emergence of certain "failed states," incapable of fulfilling their
state responsibility and expressing their consent to the establishment of
administrative structures and democratic institutions on their behalf, has
introduced what may be called a third generation humanitarian interven-
tion. The United Nations' operations in the Congo (ONUC), Cambodia
(UNTAC) and Somalia (UNOSOM), and the European Union's involve-
ment in Mostar (Bosnia-Herzegovina) belong to this generation of
humanitarian intervention.
There is a growing concern in the international community about the
need to promote and protect humanitarian standards all over the world.
Past experience shows that once a humanitarian crisis breaks out, it is
difficult to control. Instead of providing relief to refugees, for instance,
it is better to arrest situations that create refugees. For this purpose, the
United Nations and allied international institutions intend to evolve a
preventive regime which includes an early warning system, preventive
diplomacy, and post-conflict confidence-building measures. It has been
suggested, therefore, that "[t]he United Nations should adopt automatic
thresholds of civilian casualties that would compel deployment of large
multinational forces within a matter of days."2 As a result, a state might
become the target of external action well before the eruption of a hu-
manitarian crisis. This is what might be called a fourth generation
humanitarian intervention. Recommendations made in An Agenda for
Peace by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali,3 as well as many other new
steps taken by the United Nations and its expert bodies and specialized
agencies, represent the ongoing evolution of this innovative and inescap-
able generation of humanitarian intervention. The proposed U.N. inter-
vention in Burundi, which has been opposed by the target state, 4 exem-
plifies anticipatory intervention. Supporters of such intervention argue
that the responsibilities imposed on the international system and on
international organization are finally being taken seriously. The original
Hammarskjold model of preventive diplomacy should give way to the
2. Milton Leitenberg, The Rwanda Massacres Should Have Been Prevented, TIMES OF
INDIA, Aug. 6, 1994, at 9.
3. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking
and Peace-keeping, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/277
(1992) (Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit of
the Security Council on January 31, 1992) [hereinafter An Agenda for Peace].
4. Burundi Rejects U.N. Peacekeepers, TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 21, 1994, at 14.
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Boutros-Ghali model. The proponents of this view care little about state
sovereignty, an attitude characterized by their concept of "universal
sovereignty." They contend that "humanitarian intervention should not
be viewed as an affront to sovereignty, but as a necessary tool to pre-
serve it."5 The proponents of this view appear poised to transform
international morality into a revolutionary legality.
The concept of humanitarian intervention has come a long way from
the assertion of the right to rescue of nationals to the establishment of
international tribunals to punish the violators of humanitarian norms. It
has ignored the traditional distinction between humanitarian law and
human rights law, and has embraced both sets of norms. Yet in the
application of the norms there has always been little humanitarianism
and more interventionism. The expanding willingness to use the concept
of humanitarian intervention and the shrinking sensitivity towards the
principle of state sovereignty are bound to reflect upon the scope of
humanitarian intervention.
B. Target States
Generally, sovereign states are the targets of humanitarian interven-
tion. However, third generation humanitarian intervention has so far
been carried out in territories lacking one of the attributes of statehood,
i.e., a government. An entity that does not possess all the attributes of
statehood is more vulnerable to external intervention. The main reason is
that, conceptually, an intervention against such an entity does not consti-
tute a violation of Article 2(4) or 2(7) of the U.N. Charter. Also, exter-
nal forces have a temptation to impose on that entity the moral order of
their choice without running the risk of counter collective security
measures. Thus, the emergence of failed states and a neo-trusteeship
system has enlarged the scope of humanitarian intervention.
C. Intervening Powers
States are the primary actors in international relations. They are the
original exponents and the chief perpetrators of first generation humani-
tarian intervention. They are also the principal participants in the suc-
ceeding generations of humanitarian intervention. The reasons for the
primacy of states are clear. States fulfil a parens patrie role in respect of
their subjects. They have the. primary responsibility for the well-being of
their subjects. They possess or are expected to possess the necessary
5. David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The Legal Foundation of
Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 235 (1994).
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capability and willingness to meet that responsibility. If they fail to do
so, they lose their political legitimacy.
International intergovernmental organizations generally do not carry
out first generation humanitarian intervention.6 Their involvement in
other types of humanitarian intervention depends on their objectives,
purposes, legal personalities, political clout, and nexus with the theatre
of intervention. For that reason, the League of Nations had a role to
play in the protection of minorities during the inter-war period. Now the
United Nations has a role in every case of humanitarian intervention.
The European Union (EU), the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) have also occasionally dealt with
humanitarian intervention in their respective jurisdictions. According to
the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter, especially Articles 1(4), 2(4)
and 2(7), all cases of humanitarian intervention should be handled by
the United Nations. In practice, however, states bring a matter to the
United Nations only when there is no alternative. But the leading role of
the United Nations in third and fourth generation humanitarian inter-
ventions is indispensable.
Of late, several nongovernmental organizations have also come to
play a major, although not a leading, role in humanitarian intervention.
Because of their inferior legal status in the international system, they
themselves do not carry out humanitarian intervention. They do, howev-
er, often advocate, influence, and participate in second, third, and fourth
generation humanitarian interventions. This fact is recognized by the
U.N. Security Council in its several resolutions.7 The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and M6decins Sans Fronti6res are
6. The U.N. intervention in the case of Count Folke Bemadotte, the United Nations
Mediator in Palestine, to seek reparations for the injuries suffered by itself and also by one of
its employees, is probably the first instance of the United Nations intervention that approaches
first generation humanitarian intervention. The possibility of rescue of U.N. peacekeepers, as
for instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is another instance of such intervention. Also an attack
on U.N. troops is an international crime, which may invite humanitarian intervention even of
a punitive nature.
7. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR 47th Sess., 3069th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751
(1992); S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR 47th Sess., 3093d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RESf764 (1992); S.C.
Res. 767, U.N. SCOR 47th Sess., 3101st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/767 (1992); S.C. Res. 770,
U.N. SCOR 47th Sess., 3106th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992); S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR
47th Sess., 3106th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RESV771 (1992); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR 47th Sess.,
3145th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.. S/RE794 (1992); S.C. Res. 811, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3182d mtg.
at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/811 (1993); S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3188th mtg. at 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/814 (1993); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.




two names that have been heard in connection with every case of hu-
manitarian intervention in recent years.
III. MAJOR ISSUES
The objectivity, validity, nature, and priority of humanitarian inter-
vention are four major issues to be considered in any discussion of its
lawfulness.
A. Moral Objectivity
In theory, the first and .the foremost factor in the process leading to
a humanitarian intervention is the interpretation of a situation, both in
terms of hard facts and moral values. At the very first stage of this
process, the intervening power has to determine whether the situation
prevailing in the target state is in conformity with the minimum moral
principles of state behavior. The following three sets of principles may
serve as guidelines for reaching a correct moral judgment:
(a) Universal principles, which find expression in international
human rights instruments;
(b) Principles followed by the intervening power internally
(within its own territory) and externally (in international
relations), which may be discerned from the law and prac-
tice of the intervening power; and
(c) Principles applicable during normal conditions in the target
state, as demonstrated by the 'practice of the target state.
Each set of these principles constitutes an autonomous moral order.
It is practically impossible to find all three moral orders in harmony
with each other. The next step is an objective assessment based on the
ordered moral preferences of the intervening power. At that stage, the
rational choice should be based on, first, universal principles; second,
national principles in normal times; and third, principles in the practice
of the intervening power to the extent that they are consistent with
universal principles. In case of a dilemma regarding a rational choice,
one should look into the following factors:
(a) Whether the expected utility of humanitarian action for the
target state (not that of the intervening power) is greater
than that of inaction;
(b) Whether the intervenor has eschewed its self-interest;
Spring 1995]
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(c) Whether the intervenor has made a rational choice of
means and ends;
(d) Whether the intervenor has exhausted all available non-
coercive remedies to ameliorate the conditions of the af-
fected persons; and
(e) Whether the moral judgment and the ensuing action are in
conformity with the basic principles of international law.
The first factor focuses on the interests of the affected people; the
second implies the enlightened self-interest of the intervenor; the third
points towards transparency in decision making; the fourth seeks to
enforce the principle of pacific settlement of disputes; and the last
requires a mechanism to test the validity of all important components of
the humanitarian intervention, starting from the locus standi to the
modus operandi of the intervenor. These factors taken together may help
in determining moral objectivity.
In practice, we find that extraneous factors, mainly the self-interest
of the intervening power, rather than objective morality, influence the
interpretation of a situation for the purpose of humanitarian interven-
tion.8 We rarely find enlightened self-interest coinciding with humanitar-
ian intervention. One commentator rightly states: "Those most capable
of organizing collective action are the least capable of recognizing
injustice, while those most capable of recognizing injustice are least able
to organize successful collective action."9
When we observe the decision-making process relating to humani-
tarian intervention in action, we find that the pervasiveness of the elec-
tronic media, rather than the gravity of the humanitarian crisis, plays a
greater role in getting an intervening power to act. The Rwandan crisis
illustrates what may be called the "CNN effect" on the morality of the
8. See Presidential Decision Directive 25, quoted in Elaine Sciolino, New U.S. Peace-
keeping Policy De-emphasizes Role of the U.N., N.Y. TiMEs, May 6, 1994, at 1, 3. The
directive addresses six major issues: (1) Making disciplined and coherent choices about which
peace operations to support; (2) Reducing U.S. costs for U.N. peace operations; (3) Defining
clearly U.S. policy regarding the command and control of U.S. military forces in U.N. peace
operations; (4) Reforming and improving the United Nations' capability to manage peace
operations; (5) Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations;
and (6) Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress and the
American public on peace operations. See The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming
Multilateral Peace Operations (Department of State Publication 10161, Bureau of Internation-
al Organization Affairs, May 1994).




international community. Events in Rwanda had been widely reported
for a long time, but they hit the headlines only in mid-1994. Even that
wave of print media publicity did not prompt the international communi-
ty to act. The United States did not take action until July 25, 1994, one
week after CNN started full-scale televised coverage of the refugee
crisis. Thus the telegenic impact of human misery, not its very existence
as such, seems to shape the objective morality of the international
community.
B. Legal Validity
There are very few opportunities for testing the legal validity of a
humanitarian intervention. Since states generally do not wish to pay a
price for their actions, they naturally avoid a legal and moral accounting
of their intervention. Whenever they are forced to do so, they find the
process unpleasant. For instance, the widely published judgment of the
International Court of Justice in the Military and Paramilitary Activities
case exposes the gaps in the legal and moral justifications of the U.S.
humanitarian intervention in Nicaragua.'0 Also, the report of the U.N.
inquiry group on the U.N. action in Somalia does almost the same.
There is a need to distinguish humanitarian intervention from hu-
manitarian assistance. The difference exists in terms of their origins,
applicable law, state practice, and the practice of international organiza-
tions. Humanitarian intervention raises doubts, whereas humanitarian
assistance attracts appreciation. The former is a century-old concept,
whereas the latter came into vogue in the twentieth century." Despite its
late entry into international jurisprudence, the concept of humanitarian
assistance has acquired the status of a customary norm of international
law. It has both opinio juris and state practice to support it. The opinio
juris of states may be gleaned from their acceptance of various obliga-
tions under the Charter of the United Nations. It is a duty of all member
states to extend every assistance to the United Nations (Article 2(5)) in
the fulfilment of the Organization's objectives and purposes, including
the promotion of international cooperation in resolving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character and
in promoting and encouraging of respect for human rights and for
10. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
11. The League of Nations had been responsible for discussion and action in more fields
of humanitarian endeavour than any organization in the pre-World War II history. It support-
ed humanitarian assistance in cases such as the problem of epidemics in Poland and Russia in
1920-23. See F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 101-03 (1952). This
experience helped in building the social, economic, and humanitarian programs of the United
Nations system.
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fundamental freedoms without any discrimination (Article 1(3)). The
purpose of international cooperation (Article 1(3)) finds extension in the
principle of assistance (Article 2(5)), and both of them find extension in
Article 49, which lays down the Members' obligation of mutual assis-
tance, and also in Article 56 whereby they pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55, including the pro-
motion of human rights and solutions of international economic, social,
health, and related problems.
Besides these provisions in the U.N. Charter, there has always been
an unwritten law that measures a nation's level of civilization by the
yardstick of its humanitarian assistance to needy people. It has been a
traditional way of life in the Orient, and has unquestionable moral
sanctity in every religious faith.
As for the state practice of humanitarian assistance, there have been
innumerable cases where most countries have responded to calls for
such aid. Invariably they do it on an ad hoc basis, and almost all of
them contribute to the regular budgets of various international organiza-
tions which provide relief and assistance to needy people and states. In
fact, the concept of burden sharing, which has gained ground in the
context of humanitarian assistance to refugees in particular, is an exten-
sion of the duty to extend humanitarian assistance. Even before the
adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 (1991) on Iraq and
Resolution 733 (1992) on Somalia, various states provided different
forms of humanitarian assistance. If we adopt a dynamic definition of
the term humanitarian assistance, by linking relief assistance with devel-
opment assistance, then we find the Marshall Plan as the first instance
of concerted state practice on the subject during the Charter era. The
African Recovery Plan devised in the 1980s is another major instance of
the same kind of action. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 1974
declaration on the establishment of the New International Economic
Order (NIEO) has a provision for obligatory official development assis-
tance at a level of 0.7% of the GNP of developed countries. Some of
these countries have already reached the target, and others are not
opposed to the idea of development assistance in principle, but have not
accepted the target level because of financial constraints.
The difficulty arises when, on the one hand, we see reluctance on
the part of developed countries to extend official development assistance
as a matter of obligation, and on the other hand we find an overwhelm-
ing enthusiasm for the selective extension of emergency assistance to
certain ethnic minorities. At this point, humanitarian assistance seems to
lose its moral objectivity. When such assistance is extended without the
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consent of the target state, then it falls into the definition of humani-
tarian intervention (or perhaps just plain intervention). The force and the
legitimacy with which a state can claim the right or duty of humani-
tarian assistance are missing in this type of humanitarian intervention.
The practice of states in intervening on humanitarian grounds has
been so haphazard, parochial, and controversial that it cannot create a
customary norm of humanitarian intervention. This lacuna is strikingly
borne out by the fact that whenever states have carried out a humani-
tarian intervention, they did so not because they felt legally bound to do
so, but because they felt it convenient and desirable to do so. In other
words, there was no opinio juris in favor of unilateral humanitarian
intervention.
Under the U.N. Charter, however, Article 51 may permit humani-
tarian intervention in terms of self-defense under certain limited circum-
stances, and the Security Council may permit intervention as a collective
security measure. As for the former, two points must be highlighted.
First, the inherent right of individual self-defense cannot extend beyond
the humanitarian intervention for the protection of one's own nationals,
and that too is subject to controversy and the Caroline doctrine. 2 Sec-
ond, the right of collective self-defense does not include the right of
humanitarian intervention without consent because, as noted earlier,
there was no customary norm respecting such interventions in the
pre-Charter era. At best, what states have inherited under Article 51 is a
spotty and doubtful state practice which totters on the anvil of the
principle of the prohibition of the use of force. Although there are some
instances of similar practice during the Charter era, nobody has claimed
that they have created a customary norm of humanitarian intervention.
Even a widespread practice, in the absence of an incontrovertible opinio
juris, cannot give rise to customary norms. In almost all the cases of
humanitarian intervention in the last fifty years, only the interventionist
powers have supported the practice among themselves. On the other
12. On April 24, 1841, U.S. Secretary of State Webster sent a note to British Foreign
Secretary Fox regarding the British-United States controversies over the Caroline (1837) and
McLeod (1840) incidents. The note contains a number of the constituent elements of the rules
on self-defense, including the formulation that a state exercising the right of self-defense had
to show "a necessity of self defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and
no moment for deliberation," and that it "did nothing unreasonable or excessive." R.Y.
Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938). This formulation
has received the approval of the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg (1946) and
Tokyo (1948), as well as that of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case
(1949). GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
149-50 (1976).
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hand, a large number of law-making declarations and resolutions against
intervention have been adopted during the same period.1
3
As for the most contentious issue, intervention without consent, the
U.S. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law states:
Whether a state may intervene with military force in the territory
of another state without its consent, not to rescue the victims but to
prevent or terminate human rights violations, is not agreed or
authoritatively determined. Such intervention might be acceptable if
taken pursuant to resolution of a United Nations body or of a
regional organization such as the Organization of American
States.14
Experts agree that "there is scope for greater clarity, and indeed for
an advance in thinking, on the legal aspects relating to the rights and
responsibilities of the United Nations in providing humanitarian relief in
circumstances where a sovereign request for assistance is not, for a
number of reasons, forthcoming. 1 5 We may attempt to seek some
clarity by understanding and appreciating the significance of consent in
international law. We know that treaties and customs are the most
important sources of international law, and that both of these attach
great significance to the requirement of consent by sovereign states. But
an unrestricted reliance on sovereign consent cannot be allowed to arrest
the growth of new international humanitarian law. It would be unfair to
say that in the absence of the consent of the host state the international
community has no right to intervene to prevent apartheid, genocide,
ecocide, starvation deaths, or other practices that shock the conscience
of the international community. It is difficult to believe that the interna-
tional community has the responsibility to protect historical monuments,
but not the lives of human beings. There is a need to address the ques-
tion of consent in a realistic manner. The moment the international
13. The following two instruments, in particular, strengthen the principle of non-interven-
tion: Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 107, U.N. Doc. AIRES/2131 (1966); and Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 8, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970).
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 703 cmt. e (1987).
15. See Martin Griffiths & Peter Roth, The United Nations Humanitarian Response 24
(Memorandum prepared under the auspices of the Development Studies Association, London,
November 1992) (on file with the author). In his Maulana Azad Memorial Lecture at New
Delhi on 9 September 1994, Boutros-Ghali also highlighted conceptual difficulties in humani-
tarian missions of the United Nations.
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community encounters a situation where the target state or one of the
parties to a humanitarian crisis refuses to grant its consent for humani-
tarian assistance or intervention, the first question that should be asked
is why the consent is not forthcoming. The United Nations Human
Rights Committee addressed a similar issue in the context of lack of
compliance with the reporting obligations by states that are parties to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It came to the
conclusion that non-compliance was not due to bad faith of states and
that a variety of factors were responsible for cases of non-compliance.'
6
The Committee developed various alternative strategies to promote
compliance with Covenant obligations in general and reporting obliga-
tions in particular. If the premier human rights body of the United
Nations system can engage in such an exercise, why cannot the premier
security body and others conduct a similar exercise in cases of humani-
tarian assistance and intervention? The probing of consent constraints
may help in finding a better solution to humanitarian crises and also in
mobilizing greater support for humanitarian missions.
India's intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 may be examined against
this background. Because of its proximity - cultural, historical, geo-
graphical, and otherwise - and because of political and strategic neces-
sity, India was in constant touch with and had the confidence of the Sri
Lankan Government on the question of the Sri Lankan Tamils. It
brokered an accord between the Government and the Tamils of Sri
Lanka in 1987 for a peaceful settlement of this dispute. Time and again,
India had asserted its position in favor of the territorial integrity and
political independence of Sri Lanka. Yet, in June 1987, it was "driven"
to humanitarian assistance/intervention. The intervention came in the
wake of the Sri Lankan Government's move to impose a fuel and eco-
nomic embargo on the Tamil areas and the launching of a military
offensive against them. In such a situation of massive human suffering,
India delivered food and relief supplies to the beleaguered Tamils in the
North and East of Sri Lanka, first through relief boats under the aegis of
the Indian Red Cross and its flag (Operation Poomalai). Such shipments
were stopped by the Sri Lankan navy on June 2-3, 1987. Then India
delivered humanitarian relief by air force planes (Operation Eagle) on
June 4, 1987.' 7 The emergency relief operation was completed within a
couple of days and, happily, there was no human casualty in the drop-
ping of "bread bombs." But there was a political and legal casualty. The
16. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 42d
Sess., Supp. No. 40 at 8, U.N. Doc. A/42/40 (1987).
17. See JAF Drops Relief Supplies over Jaffna, THE HINDU (Madras), June 5, 1987, at 1.
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Sri Lankan Government called the Indian relief operation an act of
"desperation" and lodged a protest with the U.N. Secretary-General. The
U.S. Government expressed "regrets." The Government of China called
the humanitarian operation an intervention in Sri Lanka's internal af-
fairs. All the South Asian countries disapproved of the intervention, and
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) did not
condemn India only because of India's de facto veto. Sri Lanka did not
raise this question at the United Nations because of its international
isolation and also for fear of exposure of its questionable human rights
record.
Six years later, one Sri Lankan human rights activist analyzed the
legal aspects of the June 1987 incident and observed that the Indian
intrusion into Sri Lanka's airspace without consent "may be character-
ised as a breach of the duty to respect the sovereignty of another
state."' 8 Similarly, an Indian academic published his analysis of India's
intervention in Sri Lanka and made two important observations. First,
the main intention of India's intervention was to put a halt to Sri Lan-
ka's military approach to resolving the ethnic crisis by military means.
In other words, the "bread bombs" had no more than a symbolic value.
Second, as a result of the intervention, India had lost its credibility as a
mediator.' 9 In addition, the driving force behind the intervention was the
domestic compulsion to satisfy the Indian Tamil people who felt that the
government in New Delhi was not doing enough to protect their ethnic
brethren in Sri Lanka. Because of the absence of resolute resistance to
its June 1987 intervention, India did not pay attention to the dangers
inherent in such an adventure. As a result, later on, it sent fifty thousand
armed peacekeepers to Sri Lanka, who were known as the Indian Peace-
keeping Forces (IPKF). Out of them, 1,200 died and 2,500 were injured.
India spent about U.S. $180 million on the IPKF operation in addition
to salaries for its soldiers. The peacekeepers received so much ridicule
and hatred that the Indian defense personnel were terribly demoralized.
They went to Sri Lanka to protect the human rights of the Sri Lankan
Tamils, and they came back home with the stigma of having violated
the human rights of the very same Tamils. In addition to effects on the
IPKF, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the man who ordered the
Indian action, at the hands of the Liberation Tamil Tigers Ealam (LTTE)
18. Nirmala Chandrahasan, Use of Force to Ensure Humanitarian Relief. A South Asian
Precedent Examined, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 664, 668 (1993).




terrorists demonstrates the price of humanitarian intervention without
consent.
The following conclusions may be drawn from India's intervention
in Sri Lanka: Public pronouncements do not necessarily indicate the
political motives behind humanitarian interventions; intervention should
not be carried out without consent; dormant local forces should not be
taken for granted; no amount of use of force can compensate for the
non-cooperation of the parties concerned; there must be a constant
review of the objectives and effectiveness of humanitarian operations;
there must not be an expectation of a quick success, yet the invitation
must not be overstayed.
The long-term success of an intervention/operation depends on three
important factors. First, a sound legal basis needs to be established
through a bilateral or multilateral agreement with the parties concerned,
and when an institution like the U.N. Security Council is involved in the
matter, all efforts should be made to secure consensus on the terms and
conditions of the intervention. Second, right from the start, sincere
efforts should be made to secure the political support of all the parties
concerned. Third, adequate resources should be mobilised both for
defusing a humanitarian crisis and for promoting the welfare of the
people affected.
C. Problem of Priority
History reveals many cases of humanitarian crises where external
forces intervened, and it also reveals many more cases of arbitrariness,
indifference, and inaction in the face of such crises. For instance, the
United Kingdom intervened in Egypt to protect its nationals but it did
not do so for its nationals in Uganda. The United Nations, the United
States and many others were willing to intervene to restore the demo-
cratically elected leadership in Haiti, but not in Algeria or Nigeria.
Obviously, the intervenor decides such matters on the basis of its own
priorities, which are dictated by its national interest. Since different
intervenors have different interests and different decision-making pro-
cesses, humanitarian crises are bound to be dealt with differently and,
invariably, arbitrarily through unilateral humanitarian interventions. This
practice is not consistent with the principle of sovereign equality. It also
casts doubt on the sincerity of the statement that the "international
community cannot stand idly by in cases where widespread human
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suffering from famine, war, oppression, refugee flows, disease or flood
reaches urient and overwhelming proportions. ' 20
While an individual state or a group of states may be adventurous
enough to behave in an arbitrary manner, the United Nations can ill-
afford to follow suit. One of the main purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations is to get the Organization involved in solving interna-
tional problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charac-
ter, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without any distinction. Where such a
problem constitutes a threat to the peace or breach of the peace, the
United Nations has the responsibility to deal with the problem to
achieve more than one of its purposes. The United Nations has an
overwhelming responsibility in the humanitarian field and, legally
speaking, there is no escaping this fact. But the structure, resources, and
decision-making processes of the various organs of the United Nations
are not commensurate with these responsibilities. As a result, there is a
gap between its responsibility and capability. Given the frequency of
humanitarian crises and the extent of the international community's
desire to respond to them, the United Nations faces difficult choices
regarding the humanitarian crises in which it should involve itself. Bill
Clinton put it rather bluntly when he said that the United Nations must
learn when to say no.21 The United States may have questionable criteria
for making these decisions,22 but the United Nations has none. The
decision to terminate the U.N. humanitarian intervention in Somalia by
March 1995 was prompted by the frustration felt on the spot, rather than
by the application of well thought out criteria.23 The absence of criteria
for humanitarian intervention or for its termination gives rise to double
standards in state practice and also in the practice of the United Nations.
The presence of any such criteria, however, would violate the letter and
spirit of the U.N. Charter. With this background we can discuss the
Haitian crisis.
After a long dictatorial rule of the Duvalier family and the ensuing
uncertainty for four years after its termination, Haiti held its first presi-
dential elections on December 16, 1990, with the help of the United
Nations. Jean Bertrand Aristide secured sixty-seven percent of the vote
20. The declaration issued at the end of the London Economic Summit 1991. Cf. 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 443 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
21. See President William Clinton, Statement at the Forty-Eighth Session of the General
Assembly (Sept. 27, 1993), in U.N. Doc. A/48/PV.4, at 11 (1993).
22. See Sciolina, supra note 8.
23. See S.C. Res. 946, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. (1994).
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and became the first democratically elected President of Haiti on Febru-
ary 7, 1991. Interestingly, the outgoing regime, in an obvious attempt to
pose as greater champions of human rights, had acceded to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights a day earlier without any
reservations or declarations. On May 17, 1991, the U.N. General Assem-
bly unanimously approved an emergency aid program to build roads, to
improve the water supply, and to rehabilitate school buildings through-
out Haiti. But the Aristide Government could not complete even one
year in office. On September 29, 1991, some renegade army officers,
backed by neo-Duvalierists, the social elite, and the business communi-
ty, overthrew the Government in a violent coup. Hundreds of people
died and Aristide was arrested. While the coup leader called it "a cor-
rection of the democratic process," others condemned it.
From the first moment, the international community responded to
the crisis in a systematic manner. The ambassadors of Canada, France,
the United States, and Venezuela successfully intervened and persuaded
the coup leaders not to kill Aristide but to allow him to leave the coun-
try in order to prevent widespread bloodshed. As a result, on September
30, 1991, Aristide left for exile in Caracas. Soon after, the United States
suspended military and economic aid to Haiti, and the Government of
France followed suit. The United States, France, Venezuela, and Argen-
tina denounced the coup and demanded Aristide's return to power. On
October 2, 1991, the OAS held an extraordinary session on Haiti. The
next day, the U.N. Security Council did likewise. Both organizations
echoed the demand for Aristide's return to power. At the request of
Honduras, the question of democracy and human rights in Haiti was
included in the agenda of the forty-sixth session of the U.N. General
Assembly. On October 11, 1991, the General Assembly endorsed the
OAS efforts, appealed to U.N. members to take measures in support of
these efforts, and requested the Secretary-General to provide support to
the Secretary-General of the OAS in the matter. On October 4-6, 1991
an OAS mission, led by its Secretary-General, visited Haiti, held consul-
tations with coup leaders, and prepared the ground for collective action.
Following this visit, on October 8, 1991, the OAS voted in favor of a
trade embargo, the freezing of Haitian assets, the banning of arms sales,
and the diplomatic isolation of the military junta. Prudently, this pack-
age of sanctions also included the provision of basic humanitarian aid to
the Haitians. Significantly, the OAS rejected calls from Argentina, Costa
Rica, and Venezuela for firmer action, including the threat of direct
intervention by a multinational peacekeeping force. The OAS embargo
was tightened in May 1992 by the barring of the supply of oil to Haiti.
In addition, the OAS requested the European Community to impose a
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trade embargo. The European Community did not comply with this
request at first, but later responded favorably.
Under persistent pressure from the international community and
under the auspices of the OAS, an important breakthrough came on
February 23, 1992, when the United States-sponsored Washington
Accord was concluded between the legislature of Haiti and President
Aristide. The accord provided for Aristide's eventual return to power.
The accord also contained some impressive features. First, intervention
by any foreign forces was ruled out. Second, the accord allowed for
matters of disagreement to be placed before a conciliation commission.
Unfortunately, however, the accord encountered many difficulties in its
implementation, including a ruling by the Supreme Court of Haiti that
the implementation of the accord would be "unconstitutional."
After the coup, human suffering increased in Haiti and a large
number of the Haitians felt compelled to leave their home. Because of
their desire to seek refuge in the United States, the U.S. Government
found itself under increasing pressure, both domestic and international.
Its refugee policy in general, and the treatment of the Haitian refugees
in particular, provoked several public protests and legal disputes.
In the wake of this situation, the U.N. General Assembly at its
forty-seventh session adopted without vote two resolutions on the state
of democracy and human rights in Haiti.24 The U.N. Security Council
picked up the theme of these resolutions, invoked Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter at the request of the Haitian delegation itself, and unani-
mously adopted Resolution 841 on June 16, 1993. Resolution 841
imposed wide-ranging worldwide sanctions on Haiti, targeting both state
and non-state entities responsible for the situation there. The immediate
effect of this resolution was that the movement for the restoration of
democracy in Haiti gained momentum. The U.N. special envoy for Haiti
successfully brokered the Governors Island Agreement on July 3, 1993.
When the military junta refused to implement this agreement, the Secu-
rity Council adopted Resolution 940 on July 31, 1994. Armed with this
resolution, the United States mobilized its forces and intensified its
peace offensive. Happily, the Carter mission secured a peaceful settle-
ment at the last moment. As a result, President Aristide has returned to
Haiti, the Security Council has lifted all sanctions against that country,
the United States-led Multinational Force in Haiti (MNF) has been
replaced with the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH),25 and the
24. G.A. Res. 20B, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/20B (1993); G.A. Res.
143, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/143 (1993).
25. S.C. Res 964, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/964 (1994).
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crisis will come to an end when foreign troops are finally withdrawn. In
an interesting parallel development, the United States - the architect of
humanitarian intervention and restoration of democracy in Haiti - has
been criticized for its treatment of Haitian refugees. Such conflicting
postures of intervenors highlight a few curves of the concept of humani-
tarian intervention.
D. Individual or Collective Action
There are more cases of humanitarian intervention by individual
states than by collective bodies. After the establishment of the United
Nations, however, the preference should go to the latter. In a mega-
humanitarian crisis, in particular, an individual intervention may not
only be ineffective, but it may also worsen the crisis. Yet a number of
conceptual, geopolitical, and structural constraints hamper the active
involvement of the United Nations in many cases of humanitarian crises.
First, the debate on the interpretation of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter
remains inconclusive and is likely to remain so. Second, there is the
problem of multiple moral standards, which complicates the assessment
of objective morality. This problem is compounded by the process of
decisionmaking. Collective decisionmaking is more often correct, but is
also more difficult than individual decisionmaking. Members of the
General Assembly or the Security Council perceive their respective
self-interests differently on different occasions. Therefore, the develop-
ment of rational criteria for humanitarian intervention is no easy task.
The veto power of the five permanent 'members of the Security Council
hangs as a Sword of Damocles over the head of collective decision-
making. Even if there were no veto, many countries would probably be
averse to involvement in costly humanitarian missions.
The limited resources of the United Nations do not allow it to fulfill
its humanitarian responsibility. For instance, the U.N. Secretary-General
once said that the United Nations was not in a position to finance the
humanitarian intervention in Haiti. He therefore urged the United States
to lead and finance the multilateral forces to restore the democratically
elected government in Haiti. Also, in order to monitor the implementa-
tion of the Lusaka Protocol for Peace in Angola, the United Nations
Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) has been enlarged only after
the Angolan government's consent to share the financial burden.
As for the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention, the success of
any military operation depends, inter alia, on command, control, and
communication. In the case of a U.N. operation, the cooperation of
Member States is also important. Unfortunately, each of these aspects
has been weak in cases of humanitarian intervention by the United
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Nations. The Military Staff Committee, which should be at the center of
command-control-communication, is practically redundant. U.N. forces
are generally a motley assembly of troops with different languages,
different levels of training, different salaries, and sometimes mutually
acrimonious relationships. The U.N. operation in Somalia is a case in
point. Most of the U.S. troops there reported to the U.S. commander in
Somalia; some of them reported to the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.;
and none of them felt obliged to obey the U.N. commander. Indian and
Pakistani forces did not have a friendly relationship on the Indian
sub-continent, and were unlikely to achieve one on the Horn of Africa.
26
The result is that while a collective moral action is the most desirable
course of action, particularly when we compare it with possible alterna-
tives, its innumerable constraints bring it near to ineffectiveness. The
more likely alternative is that a system based on the leadership of selec-
tive powers will continue to develop outside of the Article 43 frame-
work.27 The renaissance of the United Nations seems to be a glorious
illusion in humanitarian matters. The humanitarian intervention in
Rwanda may be examined against this background.
Rwanda, administered by Belgium as a U.N. trusteeship, gained
independence in July 1962. Communal violence followed national
independence. The conflict had its origin in the traditional tribal rivalry
between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. It forced about
seventy thousand Tutsis to seek refuge in Uganda, with which Rwanda
had a border dispute. In 1973, a Hutu leader, Major-General Juvenal
Habyarimana, seized power in a military coup. Two years later he set up
the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (NRMD). Since
then, Rwanda had remained a one-party state. Habyarimana became the
President of Rwanda after the December 1988 elections, in which he
was the sole candidate. In December 1989, Rwanda faced severe
drought, famine, and crop disease. Since ninety percent of its export
earnings came from coffee, Rwanda suffered a severe economic crisis
following the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement in July
1989. The Government of Rwanda introduced austerity measures to
combat the economic crisis. In January 1990, it apprised diplomats in
Kigali about the crisis. The European Community and the World Food
Programme offered food, but this assistance proved inadequate.
26. On the contrary, they were alleged to be operating at cross-purposes. See Dinesh
Kumar, Hints of Pakistan Hand in Somalia Killings, TIMES OF INDIA (New Delhi), Sept. 2,
1994, at 7; M.K. Shukla, Jawans' Kin in Dark on UN Relief, HINDUSTAN TIME (New Delhi),
Sept. 11, 1994, at 11.
27. See Gregory L. Naarden, UN Intervention After the Cold War: Political Will and the
United States, 29 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 231, 253 (1994).
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The economic crisis in Rwanda, which had weakened the state
system, sharpened the political crisis both inside and outside the coun-
try. The Rwandan refugees in Uganda, mostly Tutsis, had not been
recognized as Rwandan nationals by the Government of Rwanda. On
October 1, 1990, the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
forces, led by a Rwandan-born major-general of the Ugandan army,
threatened the regime of President Habyarimana. Their demands includ-
ed the return of all Rwandan refugees, the overthrow of the
Habyarimana regime, and the reestablishment of Tutsi domination. The
RPF scored some successes but no decisive ones. About 300 Tutsis were
killed in clashes and about 3,000 were arrested in a security crackdown
by the Government of Rwanda.
On October 4, 1990, Belgium sent 535 troops and France 300 to
protect their nationals in Rwanda. Zaire also sent about 1000 troops.
The Prime Minister of Belgium and the Chairman of the OAU initiated
diplomatic efforts to end the fighting. They negotiated a ceasefire agree-
ment on October 24, 1990. The Belgians led a diplomatic initiative,
urging the creation of an African intervention force to supervise an
eventual ceasefire. Following domestic criticism, however, Belgium
withdrew its troops on November 1, 1990. President Habyarimana had
agreed to allow all refugees to return to Rwanda, but argued for a
regional conference to discuss the reintegration problem. The
Dar-es-Salaam Summit was held to resolve the refugee crisis. In July
1992, the OAU deployed a military observer group at the Rwanda-
Uganda border. On June 22, 1993, the U.N. Security Council, by its
Resolution 846, authorized the establishment of the United Nations
Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). Meanwhile, the Arusha
talks on a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of
Rwanda and the RPF continued. In January 1993, however, the RPF
abandoned the peace talks. It was condemned by Belgium, France and
the United States, as well as by the ICRC.
In February 1993, a company of French troops arrived in Rwanda to
reinforce the French forces stationed there since 1990. The RPF accused
the French troops of intervening on the government's side in the con-
flict. However, the French insisted that the troops had been deployed
solely to protect French nationals, thought to number 400. In May 1993,
peace talks at Kinihira produced agreements for the creation of a buffer
zone, a request to the United Nations for human, material, and financial
assistance, demilitarization of Kigali, and demobilization of both govern-
mental and rebel forces. The Arusha Peace Accords, envisaging the
creation of transitional institutions and power sharing, were signed on
August 4, 1993. By its Resolution 872 of October 5, 1993, the U.N.
Spring 19951
Michigan Journal of International Law
Security Council set up the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist the parties in the implementation of the
Arusha Peace Accords. But not enough progress was made in this
regard. The Security Council expressed its concern on April 5, 1994. On
the next day, President Habyarimana died in an airplane crash, which
was caused by the firing of two rockets at Kigali airport. This incident
inflicted a fatal blow on the Rwandan peace process. It unleashed a
wave of violence in which half a million people, mostly Tutsis, the
Prime Minister of the country, and ten members of the Belgian contigent
serving with UNAMIR were killed and many more fled to neighboring
countries. This was the worst manmade tragedy in recent times. Unfor-
tunately, the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), who had the respon-
sibility to protect the people, had themselves inflicted this tragedy.
Unable to cope with the violence, the Security Council decided to
withdraw most of the peacekeepers from Rwanda. The withdrawal was
a renunciation of moral responsibility and a violation of Charter provi-
sions by the United Nations itself. As a result, the United Nations
destroyed its credibility in Rwanda. This enabled some Rwandans to kill
their benefactors. When the United Nations ran away from the crisis,
relief workers of many voluntary organizations, especially the ICRC,
continued to run their relief programs at a risk to their lives.
In the wake of the April tragedy, the RPF launched a fresh offensive
from Uganda, achieved the decisive victory in mid-July 1994, and
unilaterally declared a cease-fire on July 18, 1994. Following the RPF
victory, the Hutu government went into exile. Its hate-mongering cam-
paign called on all Hutus to follow the government into exile. Fearing a
revenge massacre of Hutus by Tutsis, the Government of France re-
quested its friends and the U.N. Security Council to send peacekeeping
forces to Rwanda. While the friends of France turned down the request,
the Security Council struck a compromise. By its Resolution 929 of
June 22, 1994, the Security Council authorized member states of the
United Nations to launch a temporary operation under national com-
mand and control, aimed at contributing to the security of refugees and
civilians at risk in Rwanda, until UNAMIR was brought up to the
necessary strength. It was a French idea, popularly known as Operation
Turquoise, fiercely opposed by the RPF, politely ignored by French
allies, and half-heartedly endorsed by the Security Council. Following
the resolution, French troops came to Rwanda to provide humanitarian
assistance to the civil-war-torn population. They established a safety
zone in southwestern Rwanda, covering about one-fifth of Rwandese
territory where more than 250,000 Hutus, including the militia responsi-
ble for mass slaughters, sought refuge. Many more Rwandans fled to
(Vol. 16:883
Humanitarian Intervention Revisited
neighboring countries, but they could not escape dehydration, malnutri-
tion, or epidemics. The perpetrators of genocide became victims of
cholera. French forces came to protect Rwandans from revenge, but
their role was reduced to burying epidemic victims. Following CNN
coverage, the United States launched a massive relief operation. Some
other countries, such as the United Kingdom, joined the humanitarian
relief operation. While France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, as well as many relief organizations, were engaged in relief
operations on a war footing, the United Nations was holding conferences
to mobilize funds. Unfortunately, the nonaligned movement was sleep-
ing while Rwandans were dying. Following the two-month mandate
under Resolution 929 and having learned from the U.S. experience in
Somalia, France pulled its forces out of Rwanda on August 21, 1994
although it had hardly achieved any of the objectives of the United
Nations. The United Nations, the United States, and many others tried to
persuade France not to go ahead with its withdrawal, but France refused
to relent. As a result, thousands of Rwandans started leaving the French
safety zone for refuge in Zaire. Zaire, however, closed its borders and
its border security forces opened fire on asylum seekers. Of course, both
the intervention and non-intervention of France came under attack at the
hands of both the protagonists of inviolability of state sovereignty and
the champions of humanitarian intervention.
Forced by the prospect of French withdrawal from Rwanda, the
U.N. Security Council expanded UNAMIR. UNAMIR took over from
Operation Turquoise on August 22, 1994. In the meantime, the Broad-
Based Government of National Unity (BBGNU) had been installed at
Kigali on July 19th. These two developments put the Rwandan peace
process back on its rails. Shocked by the April tragedy, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 955 on November 8, 1994, establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on the pattern of the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territo-
ry of the Former Yugoslavia.28 Rwanda opposed the resolution, but
28. The two tribunals have many commonalities. First, both of them have been estab-
lished under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Second, both of them have similar statutes.
Third, both of them are subsidiary organs of the U.N. Security Council, and, as such, both are
dependent in administrative and financial matters on various U.N. organs. Fourth, the chief
prosecutor of both the tribunals is the same person. Fifth, the members of the appeals
chamber of the Yugoslav tribunal shall also serve as the members of the appeals chamber of
the Rwanda tribunal. At the same time, there are quite a few differences between the two
tribunals. Unlike the establishment of the Yugoslav tribunal, which was done in a two-stage
process of two Security Council resolutions (Resolutions 808 and 827) the Rwanda tribunal
has come out of a one step approach and a single resolution (Resolution 955). S.C. Res. 808,
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promised to cooperate with the tribunal.29 Everybody seems to favor the
prosecution of the perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda, but nobody
is sure about the capability of the international community or state
authorities to punish thirty thousand Rwandans responsible for the
genocide. The prosecution and punishment of the guilty will jeopardize
the chances of Hutu-Tutsi reconciliation, but the failure to do so may
further damage the credibility of the United Nations. Earlier Rwanda
ruined the image of the United Nations, and now it has presented the
Organization with an opportunity to give a new dimension to the con-
cept of humanitarian intervention.
IV. SALIENT FEATURES OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN ORDER
The traditional international law of humanitarian intervention cannot
be a good basis of a new international humanitarian law. Even contem-
porary practice is inadequate and controversial. Therefore, we have to
strike new ground. In this process, we should note the following. First,
the new international law of humanitarian assistance and intervention
should address the inadequacies that have reduced the effectiveness of
international law in general and human rights law in particular. The
progress made in the creation of a new international humanitarian law
should be tested in the light of its capacity to overcome the traditional
inadequacies of international law. Second, although the eruption of
humanitarian crises does not wait for the evolution of legal norms, the
latter does require sufficient time to evolve. Therefore, while the regula-
tion of humanitarian assistance and intervention with the help of a new
international humanitarian law is a lofty long-term goal, there is a need
to develop certain instant equitable norms to check the abuses arising
out of the absence of clarity on the subject. Finally, however good a
body of rules may be, its acceptance remains contingent upon all those
niceties of law which make it such a conservative discipline. Therefore,
the traditional law-making process may not help much in the evolution
of a new international humanitarian law.
Broadly, we find the following inadequacies or weaknesses in
international law: the lack of clarity, consistency, and credibility; the
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., q.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993); S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). Also, while the main aim of the
Yugoslav tribunal is to force the Serbs to resolve the Balkan crisis, the chief objective of the
Rwanda tribunal is to give a humane face to the Rwandan peace process.
29. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
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absence of a reliable dispute settlement mechanism; the lack of account-
ability of major international actors; the lack of mechanisms to make
effective use of the people's power to address international controver-
sies; and the increasing expectations of masses in face of the limited
resources of international organizations. In addition, the nature of the
international legal process is such that it provides plenty of opportunities
for continuing controversies.
Despite the introduction of many progressive features during the
U.N. Charter era, international law has not given up its image of being
an international social contract of the Hobbesian kind. This image has
not been improved by the handling of humanitarian crises in recent
years. The end of the Cold War has not freed the international commu-
nity from many traditional fears, and the United Nations has not been
able to tap "peace dividends" for its humanitarian operations. On the
other hand, certain developments at the domestic level may cause the
United States to change its policy, thereby leaving humanitarian inter-
vention to the United Nations.3" These developments may influence the
policies of other countries as well.
A vast majority of nations feel that the U.N. Security Council is an
inappropriate body to evolve a new, just, and equitable humanitarian law
particularly as it is dominated by the sole superpower. Instead, they
repose more faith in the lesser known but better structured organs of the
U.N. system, including the General Assembly. For instance, while Iraq
has vehemently criticized the Security Council, it has not uttered a word
against an organ like the Human Rights Committee which censured the
Iraqi human rights record in no less critical language.31 It is appropriate,
therefore, that all the relevant organs and bodies, especially those that
deal with human rights matters and economic development programmes,
should be involved in the creation as well as the implementation of
humanitarian norms even under Chapter VII of the Charter. In other
words, the norm-creating process and the body of norms should reflect
the will of states as well as that of non-state entities. The same values
should be reflected in the implementation of humanitarian norms.
30. Following the "Contract with America," the Republican-controlled U.S. House of
Representatives voted on February 16, 1995, to cut or even eliminate U.S. payments for U.N.
peacekeeping operations. H.R. 501, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). A similar measure was
introduced in the Republican-dominated Senate. If adopted by the Senate and not vetoed by
the President, the new measure would become law, thus reducing U.S. support for humanitari-
an intervention by the United Nations.
31. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 47th
Sess., Supp."No. 40, at 150-58, U.N. Doc. A/46/40 (1991); Report of the Human Rights
Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 49-58, U.N. Doc.
A/47/40 (1992).
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Since mankind is expected to survive indefinitely, short-term politi-
cal gains should not obscure the need to evolve a broad-based body of
norms which should be capable of responding to a humanitarian emer-
gency without neglecting the need to attain long-term goals. None of the
resolutions of the Security Council take this into consideration. By their
nature, they reflect ad hocism and, in some cases, adventurism as well.
Fortunately, there is a ray of hope in a number of developments. The
first of these is contained in certain General Assembly resolutions,
especially Resolution 46/182 of December 19, 1991. The guiding princi-
ples envisaged in this resolution may become salient features of a new
international humanitarian order. In addition, such a regime should
incorporate a dispute settlement mechanism which may be invoked by a
party to a humanitarian crisis. The existence and operation of such a
mechanism would make the regime of humanitarian intervention and
assistance more transparent and acceptable to the international communi-
ty at large. The creation of the office of the Undersecretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs is another welcome development. While it may not
help much in attaining normative and operational transparency in the
near future, it will certainly increase operational coordination. Yet
another development which has promoted the cause of the evolution of
a new and sensitive humanitarian order is the involvement of a large
number of voluntary relief agencies, which also build worldwide public
opinion. However, as noted earlier, the existing institutional order does
not reflect the importance of these agencies or that of world public
opinion in the decision-making process in cases of humanitarian assis-
tance and intervention. Since relief agencies contribute substantially to
humanitarian assistance and also command the confidence of
relief-receivers, they should have an institutionalized participation in the
decision-making process of any humanitarian assistance operation in
which they are involved. Humanitarian assistance is too serious a matter
to be left with state-centric bodies.
The U.N. Secretary-General rightly states: "Power brings special
responsibilities, and temptations."" Whenever an institution or an indi-
vidual is endowed with large powers, without corresponding checks and
balances, there is a tendency to exercise them freely and sometimes
arrogantly. This experience of every civilized state should raise concerns
about the new role of the United Nations, especially that of the Security
Council, in the maintenance of international peace and security. The
abuse of power by the Security Council cannot be ruled out. The U.N.
32. See An Agenda for Peace, supra note 3, para. 80.
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Charter gives an impression that the Security Council can do no wrong.
It does not envisage any mechanism to review Security Council action.
Thus it is important to consider the need to evolve appropriate innova-
tions to fill this gap. We must make it clear that an arbitrary interpreta-
tion of Charter provisions and implementation measures without pros-
pect of redemption brings the concept of the rule of law into disrepute
and makes the presence of "the principal judicial organ" of the United
Nations redundant. The International Court of Justice should be given
greater responsibility in preventive diplomacy, post-conflict peace-
building, and the administration of the collective security system under
Chapter VII of the Charter, especially in the determination of "the
proper law applicable to a legal component of a dispute."33 The Court's
advisory opinions may be sought in the determination of a "threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" under Article 39 of the
Charter, or on any other matter. For similar purposes, as well as for
many others, the United Nations should also seek the services of an
advisory council consisting of independent jurists, representatives of
leading voluntary relief organizations, and representatives of major
powers that do not have representation on the Security Council. It is true
that determinations of "threats to peace" are largely political in nature,
but the sense of fairness demands that all ways of securing peace should
be explored before a coercive operation is launched. Moreover, the
involvement of non-political organs in the administration of the collec-
tive security system would enhance the political legitimacy of the ac-
tions of the political organs of the United Nations. The Court's expertise
should be sought in the determination of legality of actions by any
organ of the United Nations.34 It should be agreed by states that "all
objections of unconstitutionality should in the last resort - that is, if
the objection is maintained after the preliminary decision of the organ
against which it is made - be referred to the International Court of
Justice for an Advisory Opinion, and that such an Opinion should be
33. What part the Court can and should now play in the collective security system has
been articulated by Sir Robert Y. Jennings, President of the Court, in his speech concerning
the 1991 report of the International Court of Justice submitted to the General Assembly. See
Speech by Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings on the Report of the International Court of Justice,
U.N. Doc. A/46/4 (1991), reprinted in 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 249, 252-53 (1992).
34. After a brief but in-depth analysis of the Court's order in Libya v. United States
(1992), Thomas Franck considers the Court as "the ultimate arbiter of institutional legitima-
cy." He observes: "The legality of actions by any U.N. organ must be judged by reference to
the Charter as a 'constitution' of delegated powers. In extreme cases, the Court may have to
be the last resort defender of the system's legitimacy if the United Nations is to continue to
enjoy the adherence of its members." See Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comment, The
Powers of Appreciation: Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
519, 523 (1992).
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final and binding. ' 5 Hopefully, the proposed balance of power and
accountability will enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the
United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security.
V. SUMMATION
The basic thrust of the concept of humanitarian intervention lies in
the responsibility of the international community in maintaining the
moral correctness of the nation-state system. In terms of state practice
and the practice of international organizations, however, the concept has
witnessed many changes over the years. The degree of those changes is
not reflected in the law on the subject. Recent attempts to create ad hoc
regimes of humanitarian intervention have increased the confusion.
Uncertainties over future humanitarian crises, growing sensitivity of the
public at large over humanitarian matters, shrinking willingness of lead-
ing states to shoulder the responsibility in risk-prone areas, and norma-
tive anarchy have not only questioned the efficacy of the existing law
on humanitarian intervention but have also presented a powerful thesis
for the evolution of a new law on the subject. The progressive develop-
ment and codification of a new law of humanitarian intervention ought
to reflect normative transparency, both in terms of substance and proce-
dure. This is possible when not just the U.N. Security Council but also
all other relevant organs of the U.N. system are involved in the process.
Operational transparency is necessary to ensure the credibility of the
intervenor, be that a state or an international organization. This is possi-
ble, inter alia, by giving precedence to humanitarianism over interven-
tionism, by reforming the Security Council, by granting an appropriate
legal status to the nongovernmental actors' participation in humanitarian
intervention (including their role in the decision-making process), and
by creating a dispute settlement mechanism available to the parties
involved in humanitarian intervention. The achievement of such a nor-
mative and operational transparency seems to be a dream today. But it
may nevertheless come true.
35. Although these views were expressed on unconstitutional acts of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), they have equal significance for the United Nations. See
Ebere Osieke, Unconstitutional Acts in International Organizations: The Law and Practice of
the ICAO, 28 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1, 26 (1979).
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